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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
V . 
JULIO I. MARTINEZ 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20110015-CA 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION 
I Appeal from convictions for Aggravated Assault Causing Serious Bodily Injury to 
Another, a Second Degree Felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(l)(A); 
Robbery, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301; two 
counts of Domestic Violence in the Presence of a Child, a Third Degree Felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109.1 and Interfering with Lawful Arrest, a Class B 
f Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann.§ 76-8-305 in the Third District Court, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Deno Himonas, Judge, presiding. 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Issue 1: The trial court erroneously failed to provide Mr. Martinez with conflict counsel 
for trial and to inquire into the nature of the conflict. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
Whether a trial court properly refuses to disqualify an attorney is a mixed question 
of law and fact. See State v. Balfour, 2008 UT App 410, % 11, 198 P.3d 471. 
Defense counsel did not request new counsel for the defendant, although the 
defendant raised these issues repeatedly pro se to the trial court, both by written and oral 
motion, which the trial court denied. See R. 133-41, 344:5-28, 360. 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
This appeal is governed by U.S. Const. Amend. V, VI and XIV, Utah Const. Art. I 
§§ 7, 12. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On May 11,2009, the State charged Martinez with Attempted Criminal Homicide, 
a First Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-201, Robbery, a Second 
Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301; two counts of Domestic 
Violence in the Presence of a Child, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-109.1 and Interfering with Lawful Arrest, a Class B Misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann.§ 76-8-305. R. 1-4. 
On June 7, 2010, Mr. Martinez moved the court to appoint him new counsel 
alleging ineffective assistance. R. 133-41. The trial court denied that motion. R. 360:19. 
The case was tried to a jury over a three-day period from August 2-4, 2010. R. 
343.45. The jury returned a verdict of guilty to the lesser-included offense of aggravated 
2 
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assault causing serious bodily injury, a second degree felony, and guilty of every other 
offense on the information. R. 263-64. 
On August 18, 2010, following trial, Mr. Martinez's appointed counsel moved to 
withdraw and to appoint him a conflict attorney. R. 303-04. Conflict counsel filed a 
motion to recuse the trial judge and to seal the record. R. 314-19. Both motions were 
denied by the court on September 1, 2010. R. 320-22. 
On October 8, 2010, the court sentenced the defendant to 1 to 15 years in the Utah 
State Prison and a consecutive 1-15 year sentence, which two sentences were to run 
consecutively to defendant's other prison commitment. R. 335-36. On October 19, 2010, 
Mr. Martinez filed a motion for new trial. R. 337-41. On November 19, 2010, the 
defendant withdrew his motion for new trial. R. 363:4. 
On December 3, 2010, conflict counsel filed a motion to withdraw and requested 
conflict appellate counsel. R. 347-48. Additionally, he filed a stipulated motion to extend 
the time for filing a notice of appeal. R. 349-51. On December 6, 2010, defendant filed a 
notice of appeal. R. 352. On January 14, 2011, the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
filed a motion for substitution of conflict counsel. R. 356-57. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
a. The Motion for Ineffective Assistance 
Prior to trial, Mr. Martinez filed a pro se motion, alleging ineffective assistance of 
counsel. R. 133-41. Defense counsel said that Mr. Martinez, "did not like some of the 
assessments that I gave him and also that Ms. Shreve gave him in regards to the jury 
3 
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trial." R. 360:4. Both counsel went to the jail and visited him. R. 360:5. According to 
defense counsel, "Mr. Martinez in essence indicated that unless we met a list of his 
demands, so to speak, he was going to send this letter out." R. 360:5. 
Mr. Martinez addressed the court. First, he complained that his attorneys would 
not file a motion to suppress a statement taken from the defendant's father in which the 
defendant allegedly threatened him. R. 360:7-9, 16. Additionally, he alleged that his 
attorneys had not regularly spoken with him, particularly about a DCFS report. R. 360:9-
10, 17-18. His main concerns centered on a lack of communication: "they aren't telling 
me what we don't got and what we do got. And how are we supposed to be ready for trial 
in August...[?] That was what my main concern is I felt I wasn't getting their best — by 
defending me." R. 360:19. 
Defense counsel contended that they did not have a valid legal basis to file a 
motion to suppress the father's statements. R. 360:10-12. Additionally, defense counsel 
indicated the statement would not be relevant because the state did not plan on 
introducing it at trial. R. 360:12. 
As to the communication issue, defense counsel told the court he visited Mr. 
Martinez, "more than most" of his clients, approximately three to four times a month. R. 
360:13-14. Mr. Martinez acknowledged the visits, but said they only happened when he 
asked for them. R. 360:15. 
The trial court said that he saw "absolutely no basis for replacing counsel in this 
case." R. 360:19. 
4 
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a. The Motion to Sever. 
Before trial began, defense counsel moved to sever count two, the robbery, from 
the remaining counts. R. 343:6. The State reasoned that the two should be connected 
because "one crime precipitates the other ... the attempted homicide precipitates the 
robbery. The robbery is part of the getaway." R. 343:6. The State said that count two only 
involved the getaway and not the retail theft of scissors and cigarettes that occurred prior 
to the attempted homicide, stating that the State removed that charge from the 
information. R. 343:7. The State also stated that it would not raise any gang issue in front 
of the jury. R. 343:7-8. 
Defense counsel indicated concern that the State would plan to use the scissor 
theft as a prior bad act. R. 343:8-9. She also expressed concern that the robbery occurred 
at a separate location. R. 343:12. The court denied the motion to sever. R. 343:12. But it 
indicated that the State was not to bring up anything about the theft of the scissors or 
gang connections. R. 343:13-14. 
c. Motion to Prohibit Officer from Classifying Victim as Delta. 
Prior to trial, defense counsel asked the court to prohibit Officer McPhie from 
testifying that when he arrived, he classified the victim as in condition delta, or one step 
short of death. R. 343:18. Defense counsel alleged the officer lacked the qualifications to 
make that conclusion. Id. The court denied that motion. Id. 
5 
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d. Discussion on Phone Call from Defendant to Victim 
The morning of trial, defense counsel indicated the State told him that they had a 
recorded phone conversation of the defendant allegedly calling the victim. R. 343:20. 
Defense counsel had yet to receive the CD. Id. One of the prosecutors indicated he hand-
delivered the CD to defense counsel's receptionist. Id. The State indicated that they were 
planning on using the CD the next day, and defense counsel asked for an opportunity to 
review the CD. R. 343:21. 
e. Testimony of Officer McPhie 
David McPhie, a West Valley City police officer, testified that on May 5, 2009, he 
responded to a call of a stabbing. R. 343:38-39. He arrived at the location at 4:30 am. R. 
343:40. He stood close to the door and listened, then knocked. R. 343:41. A child, 
Gabriel, opened the door and the officer noticed blood on the entryway. R. 343:42, 45. 
He grabbed the child, whom he described as frozen, and took him outside. R. 343:42-43. 
The officer then testified, over objection, that Gabriel said, "my dad just killed my mom." 
R. 343:44. 
The officer set the boy down, then proceeded into the home where he observed 
blood on the living room carpet and items strewn about. R. 343:44-45. As the officer 
cleared the rooms in the home at gunpoint, he heard a moan and a gurgling sound from 
behind the front door. R. 343:45-47. As he approached, he saw a woman, covered in 
blood, lying in the fetal position on the stairs. R. 343:47. The officer noticed open stab 
wounds on her legs and radioed in a delta assessment, one step short of being deceased. 
6 
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R. 343:48-49. The officer acknowledged that he had only basic first aid training. R. 
343:69. The woman then indicated to the officer that "her ex-husband had stabbed her." 
R. 343:49. She also carried on a conversation with the officer and gave him the name and 
number of her sister. R. 343:76-77. The officer cleared the rest of the home, found 
another child, Isaiah, upstairs crying, consoled him, and returned downstairs. R. 343:49-
52. 
The officer located several spots of blood on the window behind the couch, on the 
blinds, and on the wall. R. 343:60, 63. He also found a pair of scissors on the couch. R. 
343:61. The scissors appeared to have blood and hair on them, and the officer opined that 
these scissors had been used in the assault. R. 343:62. He also found a tequila bottle 
partially underneath the couch with blood on it. R. 343:64. 
f. Testimony of Jose Jimenez 
Jose Jimenez testified that he was working at a 7-Eleven on 3500 South and 
Redwood Road washing the ground outside when a vehicle pulled up. R. 343:88-90. Jose 
was a convicted felon who was on probation for possession of a controlled substance with 
the intent to distribute. R. 343:108. Jose followed the customer, whom he had seen 
before, into the store and went behind the register. R. 343:90-91. The man appeared to be 
intoxicated. R. 343:107-08. This was the first time the man had ever talked with Jose. R. 
343:107. The man asked him for cigarettes, also picked up some scissors then Jose 
scanned his items. R. 343:91. The man left the store. R. 343:91. 
7 
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Some time later, at around 4:25 am, the same customer returned, except this time 
he appeared upset, lacked a shirt and had blood on his hands. R. 343:93-94, 96. The man 
asked for gas, and Jose told him he needed to prepay. R. 343:94. The man came back in 
and asked for gas, but still had not prepaid. R. 343:95. The third time the man came in 
aggressively, Jose told him the pumps weren't working. R. 343:95-96. The man said to 
turn on the gas pumps "because he was going to hurt me." R. 343:96. The man then said 
if the pumps weren't working that "I was going to lose my life." R. 343:97. At no point in 
the encounter did Jose attempt to call the police, even though a phone was right behind 
him. R. 343:109-10. At this point, patrol officers arrived. R. 343:97. 
g. The Offer 
After Jose's testimony, Mr. Martinez asked counsel whether the State had made an 
offer. R. 343:104. The State offered Mr. Martinez a deal where he would plead guilty to 
Count I as a three to five and to both counts of domestic violence in the presence of a 
child. R. 343:105. The domestic violence commitments would run consecutively to count 
one. R. 343:105. Mr. Martinez rejected the offer, and after the court's colloquy, elected to 
continue with trial. R. 343:106. 
h. Discussion Surrounding Improper Impeachment 
During defendant's cross-examination of Jose Jimenez, counsel attempted to 
impeach the witness with his testimony in the preliminary hearing, asking whether he 
testified that he had had dozens of prior conversations with the man. R. 343:112. The 
prosecutor objected saying that Jose previously indicated simply that he had seen the man 
8 
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before. R. 343:113. After this exchange, defense counsel ended questioning and the jury 
left the courtroom. R. 343:114. At this point, the following exchange took place: 
THE COURT: You know better than that, Ms. Shreve. 
THE DEFENDANT: What is it—I don't understand. What do you mean when she 
said— 
THE COURT: Okay. I wasn't talking to you. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, but this is regarding— 
THE COURT: I'm sorry. You sit down. I wasn't talking to you. 
THE DEFENDANT: I don't understand how— 
THE COURT: Ms. Shreve, you know better than that, right? 
MS. SHREVE: Right. 
THE COURT: [Explains the error in impeachment.] 
THE DEFENDANT: It says it right here on the preliminary transcripts. 
THE COURT: Really? Want to read it again? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. Do you want me to read it to you? 
THE COURT: Sure. 
THE DEFENDANT: [Reads the preliminary hearing statement.] 
THE COURT: Not even close. 
THE DEFENDANT: So who is saying that then? 
THE COURT: All right. We are done with this conversation. You can talk to your 
lawyers. That is an improper impeachment. 
THE DEFENDANT: Well, I think I'm going to file an ineffective assistance of 
counsel on me then because you're not representing—you are not representing -you are 
not going right through the— 
THE COURT: Well, you—you know, you file whatever you think is appropriate 
with me. That's okay. I don't mid that. That is an incorrect impeachment. I've 
admonished your lawyer as a result of that. 
R. 343:114-15. 
i. Conflict with Defense Counsel 
The morning of the second day of trial, the Court indicated that at 6 pm the 
previous evening, both defense counsel engaged in ex-parte communications with 
presiding Judge Hilder. R. 344:5. Mr. Tan and Ms. Shreve felt "extremely threatened by 
their client to the point that they are worried about their ability to put on a defense and 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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feel that they have compromised perhaps by making some bad judgment calls ... because 
of the perceived intimidation from their client." R. 344:6. The presiding judge had called 
Judge Himonas and they tried to telephone conference the prosecution unsuccessfully. R. 
344:6. Defense counsel stated that "there's just something about this particular individual 
that raises concerns to us." R. 344:6. He then added, "I think the bigger concern is just 
our ability to continue to adequately and zealously represent Mr. Martinez in trial." R. 
344:7. The court said, "perhaps his intimidation has led you to do things that would 
otherwise be against your professional judgment." R. 344:7. Defense counsel responded, 
"That's accurate, your Honor." R. 344:7. 
The court referenced, to defense counsel, the prior night's improper impeachment, 
saying that "you've got a duty to your client and you're also an officer of the Court. And 
at some point you just call, excuse my French, bullshit, and you don't do things like last 
night. Right?" R. 344:9. The court then took a recess and allowed the parties to talk. R. 
344:11. 
After the break, the prosecutor said that defense counsel would represent Mr. 
Martinez "with the integrity of court officers and do their job like they should." R. 
344:11. She also suggested some safety measures. R. 344:11-12. The court took the 
parties to chambers where he told them that the record needed to reflect, with the 
defendant present, that his counsel "felt intimidated by him." R. 344:13. 
Back in court, the trial judge explained to Mr. Martinez that he had again listened 
to the tape, and was confident that the impeachment was improper. R. 344:15. He 
10 
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admonished Mr. Martinez, "I don't believe that your behavior was appropriate. I hope 
you won't do that." R. 344:15. Then the court addressed the conflict: "I've been informed 
by your counsel that they feel intimidated by you, whether rightfully or wrongfully,... 
and they have disclosed that intimidation and that has perhaps caused them to do things 
that they would not otherwise do as officers of the Court. ... We're going to go forward 
with this trial. Okay?" R. 344:15-16. 
At this point, the court and Mr. Martinez discussed the impeachment, then the 
defendant stated, "Well, I'm already going to fill out a motion to—file for a new counsel 
based on integrity of counsel (inaudible)." R. 344:17. The court indicated it had already 
denied that motion for no basis. R. 344:17. Mr. Martinez responded, "There are issues 
now today" adding that he thought his counsel would defend the attempted aggravated 
murder. R. 344:17-18. The court then warned Mr. Martinez about the waiver of privilege 
and the possibility that he would have to get conflict counsel. R. 344:18-19. The court 
added that he had already denied the motion for new counsel, "and maybe I'm wrong and 
will be reversed on that, it won't be the first time I'm reversed and it won't be the last 
time I'm reversed. That's okay. I just call it like I see it." R. 344:19. Defense counsel 
outlined the conflict process and also disputed the allegation that he was not working on 
the murder charge. R. 344:20-21. 
Mr. Martinez responded, "I don't agree with what you are doing." R. 344:21. The 
court acknowledged that he might not agree, but that they were at the point of calling the 
next witness. R. 344:21. The court asked Mr. Martinez what he wanted, and after 
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detailing concerns about questioning a juror, he said, "I already asked you I need new 
counsel, ineffective counsel." R. 344:22. He added, "I have a right, you know, to a fair 
trial. And I don't believe Fm being represented to the fullest like they say—like to be 
represented." R. 344:23. The court asked him if he was renewing his prior motion, and 
Mr. Martinez said yes. R. 344:23. Mr. Martinez stated his basis for the motion: 
My lawyers, they feel intimidated by me, so, therefore, we have a conflict of 
interest. So therefore, they feel they are afraid of me or whatever their complaints 
would be. So, therefore, there's a conflict between me and the lawyers. So, 
therefore, I don't see how we can, you know, communicate without me feeling 
that there's a fear between me and them. R. 344:23. 
Both defense counsel indicated that they could vigorously represent Mr. Martinez. 
R. 344:23-24. The court told defendant, "I don't think that you get to recreate the 
situation in which you get new counsel by doing that." R. 344:24. Defendant mentioned 
his specific concerns: he wanted counsel to file a motion to suppress, he also claimed he 
was told that they would be fighting one case at a time (the attempted aggravated murder, 
then the robbery) and then suddenly at trial, both cases are being tried together. R. 
344:25. The court reminded Mr. Martinez that counsel had moved to sever and that he 
denied it. R. 344:25-26. Defendant wondered why he was not at court to hear the 
argument. R. 344:26. Both defense counsel indicated that defendant was present and the 
court said, "Stop pulling my leg then Mr. [Martinez], you were here." R. 344:26. 
The court then asked to move forward and the following interchange took place: 
THE DEFENDANT: I'll agree to go forward with this counsel. 
THE COURT: I'm not giving you a choice. Your motion is denied. You have the 
right at the end— 
THE DEFENDANT: So you are violating my constitutional rights— 
12 
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THE COURT: I don't, I don't believe— 
THE DEFENDANT: - to a fair trial. 
THE COURT: I don't believe that I am. [The court explains the right to appeal or 
for a new trial.] You are being very difficult, Mr. Martinez. 
THE DEFENDANT: It's my life that's on the line. 
THE COURT: I'm not telling you that it's not. I'm telling you that I've tried—you 
know, there are a couple of hundred jury cases, and I'm telling you that you are being as 
difficult a defendant as any I have encountered in the couple of hundred jury cases that I 
have dealt with. 
Are you trying to stare me down, Mr. Martinez? For the record, are you trying to 
stare me down? 
THE DEFENDANT: I was looking at you while you are talking. 
THE COURT: Are you trying to stare me down, Mr. Martinez? 
THE DEFENDANT: I'm just looking at you while you are talking. That's all. 
(Inaudible.) 
THE COURT: How about in the back? Is that what's going on? Sir? 
UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Grinning. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
UNKNOWN SPEAKER: I'm not. 
THE COURT: All right. Are we ready to go forward? 
R. 344:27-28. After this exchange, the state called its next witness. R. 344:30. 
j . Testimony of Owen Duffy, M.D. 
Owen Duffy, an emergency room physician, testified that he did not recall 
specifically the events in question and had to testify largely from his report alone. R. 
344:31-37. However, in reviewing his report, he testified that Teresa Martinez arrived in 
tears, awake, alert and oriented. R. 344:38. She had a small laceration on her head as well 
as lacerations on her left arm and left leg. R. 344:38-39, 41. He concluded that "her vital 
signs were stable. And it did not appear that at least on the primary survey that she had 
anything life threatening." R. 344:43. He testified that Teresa's wounds were not life 
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threatening. R. 344:44. The doctor opined that someone would have to strike the major 
arteries, which did not happen in this case, for the wounds to be serious. R. 344:50. 
k. Testimony of Robert Cowan 
Robert Cowan, West Valley City police officer, testified that he heard a call over 
the radio that a short Hispanic male stabbing suspect had fled in a red Chevy Blazer. R. 
344:55, 63. He noticed a red Blazer parked in a 7-Eleven. R. 344:59. He pulled behind 
the vehicle and saw Mr. Martinez exiting the store without his shirt. R. 344:60-61. The 
officer ordered him to stop because he believed him to be the suspect. R. 344:62. As Mr. 
Martinez approached the officer, he was pointing to his head or neck area and yelling, 
though the officer did not hear what he was saying. R. 344:76-77. Mr. Martinez did not 
stop after being ordered to "multiple times." R. 344:63. Mr. Martinez headed toward the 
officer "clenching his fist, pumping his muscles, bouncing, like he was agitated." R. 
344:64. The officer saw blood on Mr. Martinez's hands. R. 344:65. As Mr. Martinez 
approached the officers, Officer Johnson yelled "taser, taser, taser" then tazed Mr. 
Martinez in the back. R. 344:68. Officer Johnson did not say anything to Mr. Martinez 
prior to tazing him. R. 344:69. Mr. Martinez fell to the concrete, hitting his head on the 
ground, and it started to bleed. R. 344:69. 
The officer testified that the blood from his head did not appear to have spread to 
Mr. Martinez's hands. R. 344:70. The officer noticed a puncture wound on Mr. 
Martinez's arm, which he opined did not come from the tazing fall, and that it seemed 
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more consistent with a stab wound. R. 344:72, 80. Though the officer acknowledged that 
he did not know whether defendant's injuries came before the fall or after. R. 344:79. 
1. Testimony of Lucas Johnson 
Officer Lucas Johnson of the West Valley City police department responded to the 
gas station as well. R. 344:82-84. He observed a heavier set Hispanic male walking 
toward Officer Cowan. R. 344:84. The man had blood on his hands and was not 
complying with Officer Cowan's orders. R. 344:88-89. He did not see blood anywhere on 
his body except on both arms from his mid arm down to his fingers. R. 344:89-90. The 
person appeared agitated with his hands clenched. R. 344:90. Officer Johnson pulled out 
his taser, looked to Officer Cowan, who nodded, then he fired the taser. R. 344:91. Mr. 
Martinez fell over and "quite loudly hit his head." R. 344:92. As the officer rolled him 
over, he noticed a 4-inch gash on the back of his head, bleeding extensively. R. 344:93. 
m. Testimony of Franco Libertine 
Franco Libertine, a West Valley City patrol officer, testified that he went to the 
crime scene and spoke with Gabriel Martinez. R. 344:103. Defense counsel objected to 
the hearsay statements, but the court overruled the objection. R. 344:104. The officer said 
Gabriel told him that he heard his father, Julio, tell his mother, Teresa, "I will kill you. 
This is what happened to you for fucking my brother." R. 344:105. The officer also went 
to the hospital to speak with Teresa Martinez. R. 344:105-06. As he approached her 
room, he heard Teresa screaming in pain, though he was able to hold a conversation with 
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her. R. 344:107, 119. She told him the name of her sister-in-law, whom she wanted to 
take the kids. R. 344:124-25. The officer photographed Teresa's injuries. R. 344:108-09. 
n. The Motion to Recuse 
After Mr. Libertine's testimony, defense counsel, in chambers made a motion to 
recuse the trial judge because of information he may have heard from presiding Judge 
Hilder pertaining to confidential client communications. R. 344:132-34. Judge Hilder got 
on the phone, and summarized that Mr. Tan and Ms. Shreve approached him expressing 
concern and challenges with their client. R. 344:135. "Mr. Tan indicated that there was a 
sense of intimidation and staring down episode and we did not discuss what was behind 
that..." R. 344:135. Additionally, Ms. Shreve told Judge Hilder that she was intimidated 
and "that there was a sense of being compromised in the ability to exercise a judgment 
they normally exercise or to make a decision they would normally make." R. 344:136. 
Judge Hilder told Judge Himonas that some defendants have gender issues that "would, 
in fact, be better served by a different counsel appointment. That that was one factor that 
might have been worked here." R. 344:136. 
Ms. Shreve indicated that "after sleeping on it, waking up this morning with some 
additional security that I felt like I am comfortable to go forward and advocate for my 
client and not allow this [to] affect my ability to represent him." R. 344:137. The trial 
court gave counsel the opportunity to talk with Judge Hilder privately about what issues 
she communicated to him. Judge Hilder said that counsel "did tell me things that would 
have been a concern" and "that the concern might be an effective strategy ..." R. 
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344:137. Ms. Shreve then indicated that "I don't think we have a good basis for a motion 
to recuse." R. 344:138. 
o. Testimony of Gabriel Martinez 
Gabriel, age 11 at the time of trial, testified that he went to bed that evening in his 
mother's room. R. 344:141, 145. In bed, he heard his mother talking and his father saying 
that "he was going to go for the people who killed his brother." R. 344:145. Gabe's father 
and mother went downstairs and he heard his father say, "do you want to see how tough I 
am?" R. 344:146. Gabe said his father then did something to his arm and he heard his 
mother say, "Stop, that's—stop that's not. . ." R. 344:146. Gabe said he climbed out of 
bed and while peeking downstairs, "I saw him stabbing my mom." R. 344:149. His father 
left again, came back in, stared at his mom, then got in his truck and left. R. 344:146. 
Gabe added that he looked out the window and saw his dad drive to the 7-Eleven and go 
inside. R. 344:146, 151. Gabe talked with police on the phone while his mom was on the 
stairs. R. 344:146-47. Gabe testified that he only saw blood on the first level of the house. 
R. 344:234. 
p. The Motion for Mistrial 
After lunch, the bailiff was asked by jurors why there were two bailiffs in the 
courtroom. R. 344:164. One of the jurors responded, "It's so the Defendant can be 
detained." R. 344:164. The bailiff responded that it was for training purposes. R. 
344:164. The court said it was inclined to instruct the jury and the state had no objection, 
other than it noted that it might be better to remain silent. R. 344:164-65. Ms. Shreve then 
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made a motion for mistrial, which the court denied. R. 344:165. Ms. Shreve indicated that 
the jury's comment made it "clear [that] they think that the client is being detained and in 
custody. And I think that is so prejudicial." R. 344:165. Defense counsel also objected to 
the fact that there were two plainclothes officers who mingled with Mr. Martinez and 
drew attention to his status. R. 344:169. 
The court offered to give a jury instruction or to question individual jurors. R. 
344:166. Defense counsel waived these methods, reasoning they would only call 
attention to Mr. Martinez's custody status. R. 344:166-167. The prosecutor noted that the 
prejudice lies in seeing the defendant in handcuffs, not knowing his custody status. R. 
344:168. The court denied a renewed motion for mistrial. R. 344:168. 
q. Testimony of Teresa Martinez 
Teresa Martinez testified that she was living alone with her two boys on May 5 . 
R. 344:172-74. Julio came over to the house, she said, and asked if he could sleep on the 
couch, since he had been drinking. R. 344:175. She invited him in because she did not 
want him to drive. R. 344:175, 210. Even though they were separated, they also were still 
friends and spoke with each other. R. 344:210. She went to bed, but about fifteen to 
twenty minutes later, Julio asked if he could sleep on the bed, and Teresa agreed, stating 
she felt comfortable with him on the bed. R. 344:175-76, 212. In bed, Julio talked about 
his brother, saying he wanted to find out who killed him. R. 344:176. He became more 
agitated, and Teresa, not wanting to wake up the children, asked him to come downstairs. 
R. 344:176. 
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Once downstairs, Julio kept talking about his brother. He said, "Do you want to 
see how I am? Do you want to see how down I am?"—then he walked into the kitchen, 
grabbed a knife and stabbed himself in the arm. R. 344:177. Teresa grabbed a towel and 
put it on his arm to apply pressure and asked him what he was trying to prove. R. 
344:178. Julio then went upstairs to talk with the kids and tell them how much he loved 
them. R. 344:178. He told the kids that he loved them, then Teresa asked him to go 
outside. R. 344:176, 179. Once outside, Julio got on the phone, then left to buy more 
cigarettes. R. 344:176-77, 179. Teresa called Julio's sister Veronica and warned her about 
her brother, then went to bed. R. 344:179-80. 
About two hours later, around 2 am, Julio returned, though Teresa acknowledged 
not looking at the clock. R. 344:180-81. She opened the door and Julio came into the 
house. R. 344:182. He asked her to have sex with him and told her that she would pay for 
sleeping with his brother. R. 344:184. Julio pulled a pair of scissors out of his pocket and 
went and turned off the lights. R. 344:185. He then stabbed Teresa repeatedly, saying, 
"This is what you get. This is what you get." R. 344:186. Teresa got into a fetal position 
to protect herself. R. 344:186. She estimated she was stabbed about fifteen times. R. 
344:188. She played dead, the stabbing stopped and Julio left driving a Chevy Blazer. R. 
344:188-89, 207. Teresa ran to the door, locked it, then hopped to the telephone and 
dialed 911. R. 344:189-90. She felt light headed and asked her son Gabriel to talk with 
the operator. R. 344:191. Soon paramedics arrived and treated Teresa. R. 344:192. 
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Teresa testified that all the injuries came from Julio. R. 344:195-98. She had 
surgery on her knee and lower left arm, testifying that they caused her a lot of pain for 
several months. R. 344:198. She lost full function of her hands. R. 344:199. She 
described needing stitches in multiple locations. R. 344:199-202. 
Teresa also admitted to lying to the police in another incident. R. 344:219-20. She 
also acknowledged that her children stayed with other family members for approximately 
six months after the incident. R. 344:220-21. 
r. The Motion for Directed Verdict 
Mr. Martinez moved for directed verdict after the State's case, alleging 
insufficient evidence to convict him on the intentionally or knowing element of the 
statute, given his intoxication. R. 344:226. Additionally, Mr. Martinez claimed that the 
evidence was insufficient to show that the injuries were actually life threatening. R. 
344:226. The court denied the motion. R. 344:226. Defendant also renewed the motion 
for mistrial, which the court said was waived. R. 344:227-28. 
Defendant also elected not to testify and confirmed that decision with the court, 
noting that no one forced him to make that decision. R. 344:228-30, 235-36. 
s. The Motion to Strike the Juror 
On the third day of trial, Mr. Martinez indicated to the bailiff that he recognized 
the juror who stated the defendant was detained. R. 345:4. Mr. Martinez moved to strike 
the juror, the state assented, and the court removed the juror from the panel, replacing 
him with an alternate. R. 345:13. 
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t. Defendant's Closing Statement 
> In defense counsel's closing argument, he asked the jury to find Mr. Martinez 
guilty. R. 345:24-25. He said, "Julio Martinez made some bad decisions." R. 345:24. 
"[Interference with an arresting officer. I want to save all of us some time. I would save 
) 
[the prosecutor] some time. ... He's guilty. You can check that off." R. 345:25. On the 
domestic violence in the presence of a child felonies, counsel said, "Julio Martinez is 
1
 guilty of that as well. Just save sometime [sic]." R. 345:25. Then counsel said, "I'm going 
to submit to you on guilty three and four based on intentionally causing serious bodily 
injury, bodily injury or use a dangerous weapon against a cohabitant." R. 345:26. 
"There's no dispute in regard to what happened. Julio stabbed Teresa multiple times." R. 
345:27. Counsel then told the jury they had only one choice: to find Julio guilty of either 
attempted criminal homicide or guilty of domestic violence and aggravated assault. R. 
345:27. As to whether the jury could find Mr. Martinez not guilty of all offenses, counsel 
said, "It's not going to happen." R. 345:27. 
To conclude, defense counsel said, "[F]rankly, Julio did not follow the law. I 
would ask that after deliberating you find Julio Martinez guilty on Count I, as domestic 
violence, aggravated assault using unlawful force or dangerous weapon ..." R. 345:40. 
u. Telephone Conference Post-Trial 
The day after the trial, the court called both counsel and held a telephone 
conference. R. 360. According to the trial judge, he was playing racquetball with his 
clerk, who also happened to be a clerk at defense counsel's office, when his clerk 
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mentioned that "Ms. Shreve was, not last night but the night before, followed home and 
had to alert the authorities." R. 360:3, 4. Defense counsel mentioned that Ms. Shreve 
called the Kaysville police. R. 360:3. The court felt it had the obligation to disclose the 
statement. R. 360:4. 
v. Sentencing and the Motion for New Trial 
At sentencing, newly appointed conflict counsel indicated that defendant had 
asked him to file a motion for new trial. R. 362:5. The court and the prosecution agreed to 
allow Mr. Martinez to file a bare bones motion and memo within the 10-day period after 
sentencing, with leave to file a substantive memo later. R. 362:6-7. 
Additionally, at sentencing, the prosecution recommended a consecutive prison 
sentence, based in part on "Defendant's behavior during trial, him causing the defense 
counsel to have concerns for their own safety ...." R. 362:9. 
Conflict counsel filed a motion for new trial, in which he alleged that "Mr. 
Martinez's trial attorneys did not fully explain discovery to him, did not adequately 
consult with Mr. Martinez prior to or during the trial. Mr. Martinez was also affirmatively 
prevented by his trial attorneys from raising various arguments and from presenting 
evidence at trial. ... The performance of Mr. Martinez's trial attorneys amounted to 
ineffective assistance ..." R. 338. Additionally, counsel asserted that because Mr. 
Martinez did not understand the discovery, his "understanding of some of the evidence 
presented by the State came at trial when Mr. Martinez was unable to adequately prepare 
and participate in his own defense. Mr. Martinez also asserts that trial counsel did not 
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consult with him or advise him regarding trial strategy and simply made numerous, 
> important decisions about the litigation of his case without adequately discussing it with 
him or even informing him at all." R. 339. Counsel also claimed that Mr. Martinez's 
attorneys failed to "follow obvious investigative leads to support Mr. Martinez's claims 
of prior violence and manipulative behavior by the state's complaining witness." R. 339. 
Finally, the motion claimed that "Mr. Martinez repeatedly asked his attorneys to ask 
1
 specific questions designed to elicit statements supporting a claim of self-defense." R. 
340. 
1
 w. Withdrawal of the Motion for New Trial 
On November 19, 2010, defendant indicated that he wanted to withdraw his 
motion for new trial. R. 363:4. The court then advised Mr. Martinez that he had thirty 
days from that date in which to file a notice of appeal. R. 363:5. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant's counsel manifested grave concerns about their ability to represent Mr. 
Martinez. They claimed that he had stared them down, and as a result, they felt 
compromised in their ability to zealously represent Mr. Martinez. They brought their 
concerns up to the presiding district court judge, who made them aware to the trial court. 
The court discussed the matters with the parties, who after a brief recess, stated that they 
felt they could continue to represent Mr. Martinez. Mr. Martinez objected and asked the 
court to appoint him new counsel. Particularly concerning to Mr. Martinez was his 
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attorneys' unwillingness to communicate with him. He asserted that he would not be able 
to have a fair trial without adequate communication with his counsel. The court, in a 
perfunctory manner, failed to adequately assess the depth of the conflict or to assure that 
counsel and Mr. Martinez were able to communicate. 
Additionally, the record reflects that counsel became more interested in the jury 
convicting Mr. Martinez of an offense, rather than holding the state to its burden. He 
never told the jury that it could hold the state to its burden and find Mr. Martinez not 
guilty of any or of all of the offenses. In fact, defense counsel asked the jury to find Mr. 
Martinez guilty of all but one offense, and proffered that they should find him guilty of a 
lesser-included offense. 
Mr. Martinez asked the court, at least three times, to provide him with counsel 
who would communicate with him and who were not afraid of him. The court failed to 
adequately assess the situation and failed to provide Mr. Martinez with counsel who were 
free from conflicts of interest. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY FAILED TO PROVIDE MR, 
MARTINEZ WITH CONFLICT COUNSEL AND TO INQUIRE 
INTO THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT 
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees each criminal 
defendant the right to the effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 
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648, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657, 104 S. Ct. 2039 (1984). See State v. Frampton, 131 P.2d 183,187 
> (Utah 1987). 
The United States Supreme Court listed several "basic duties" of defense counsel, 
which if not followed, may result in a finding of ineffective assistance. Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 688. According to the Court, because the attorney owes his client a duty of 
loyalty, an attorney must "assist the defendant," "advocate the defendant's cause," "avoid 
1
 conflicts of interest," "consult with the defendant on important decisions," and "keep the 
defendant informed of important developments in the course of the prosecution." Id. 
These standards do not form an exhaustive checklist of defense counsel's duties, rather, 
i 
defense counsel must reasonably assist the defendant in receiving a fair trial. Id. at 688-
89. "Moreover, some conduct, such as various kinds of state interference with counsel's 
assistance and active representation of conflicting interests, is so egregious that it is 
presumed to result in prejudice to defendant's defense." State v. Classon, 935 P.2d 524, 
533 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692). 
As the Court in Strickland noted: 
That a person who happens to be a lawyer is present at trial alongside the accused, 
however, is not enough to satisfy the constitutional command. The Sixth 
Amendment recognizes the right to the assistance of counsel because it envisions 
counsel's playing a role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial system to 
produce just results. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685. 
"An accused is entitled to be assisted by an attorney ... who plays the role 
necessary to ensure that the trial is fair." Id. See also Kryger v. Turner, 479 P.2d 477, 480 
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(Utah 1971) ("The right of an accused to have counsel is not satisfied by a sham or 
pretense of an appearance in the record by an attorney who manifests no real concern 
about the interests of the accused."); see also Alires v. Turner, 449 P.2d 241, 243 (Utah 
1969). "The accused is entitled to the assistance of a competent member of the Bar, who 
demonstrates a willingness to identify himself with the interests of the defendant and who 
will assert such defenses as are available to him under the law and consistent with the 
ethics of the profession. Kryger, 479 P.2d at 480. "The failure of such representation 
constitutes a departure from due process of law." Id. 
Because a violation of the right to counsel is so entwined with the right to a fair 
trial, it cannot be harmless error. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 n.8, 17 L. Ed. 
2d 705, 87 S. Ct. 824 (1967) (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 9 L. Ed. 2d 
799, 83 S. Ct. 792 (1963)). 
An attorney has a duty of loyalty to his client. This "duty of loyalty" has been 
described as "perhaps the most basic of counsel's duties." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692. 
The "faithful discharge" of the duty of loyalty is a "vital factor" mandated by the Rules of 
Professional Conduct and by the Sixth Amendment. State v. Holland, 876 P.2d 357, 359 
(Utah 1994) (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656-57, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657, 104 
S. Ct. 2039 (1984); Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 725-26, 92 L. Ed. 309, 68 S. Ct. 
316 (1948) (plurality opinion)). "[Defendants are wholly dependent on the dedication of 
their attorneys to protect their interests and to ensure their fair treatment under the law." 
Id. An attorney should be "devoted solely to the interests of his client [with] [u]ndivided 
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> 
allegiance and faithful, devoted service."Id. (citing VonMoltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 
> 725-26, 92 L. Ed. 309, 68 S. Ct. 316 (1948) (Black, plurality opinion). A defense attorney 
should force the prosecutor's case to "survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial 
testing." Id. at 361 (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657, 
104 S. Ct. 2039 (1984)). A violation of the duty of loyalty forces the process to lose "its 
character as a confrontation between adversaries, [and] the constitutional guarantee is 
violated." United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 656-57. 
Attorneys must be "active advocate[s]" and not "friend[s] of the court." Evitts v. 
Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 394, 83 L. Ed. 2d 821, 105 S. Ct. 830 (1985). "Unless an attorney 
represents the interests of a client with zeal and loyalty, the adversarial system of justice 
cannot operate." State v. Holland, SI6 P.2d at 362. 
"[E]ven when no theory of defense is available, if the decision to stand trial has 
been made, counsel must hold the prosecution to its heavy burden of proof beyond 
reasonable doubt." Cronic, 466 U.S. at 667 n. 19. The duty of loyalty prohibits a defense 
attorney from telling the jury that the state has met its burden of proof. United States v. 
Swanson, 943 F.2d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 1991). 
[T]he very premise of our adversary system of criminal justice is that partisan 
advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the ultimate objective that the 
guilty be convicted and the innocent go free. In a criminal trial, which is in the end 
basically a factfinding process, no aspect of such advocacy could be more 
important than the opportunity finally to marshal the evidence for each side before 
submission of the case to judgment. 
Id. at 1074 (quoting Herring v. New York, All U.S. 853, 862 (1975)). 
27 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Several courts have presumed prejudice when counsel have failed to zealously 
represent their clients. Javor v. United States, 724 F.2d 831 (9th Cir. 1984) (attorney slept 
through trial); Green v. Am, 809 F.2d 1257 (6th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 484 U.S. 
806, 108 S. Ct. 52, 98 L. Ed. 2d 17 (1987), reinstated, 839 F.2d 300 (1988), cert, denied, 
488 U.S. 1034, 102 L. Ed. 2d 979, 109 S. Ct. 847 (1989) (counsel's absence during cross-
examination); Siverson v. O'Leary, 764 F.2d 1208, 1217 (7th Cir. 1985) (attorney absent 
during verdict); Harding v. Davis, 878 F.2d 1341 (11th Cir. 1989) (attorney silent when 
court directed verdict against defendant). "[A]n attorney who adopts and acts upon a 
belief that his client should be convicted fail[s] to function in any meaningful sense as the 
Government's adversary." Osborn v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612, 625 (10th Cir. 1988) 
(quoting in part Cronic, 466 U.S. at 666)). An "attorney who is burdened by a conflict 
between his client's interests and his own sympathies to the prosecution's position is 
considerably worse than an attorney with loyalty to other defendants, because the 
interests of the state and the defendant are necessarily in opposition." Osborn, 861 F.2d at 
629. 
Under established law, an indigent defendant does not have a right under either the 
United States or the Utah Constitution to reject court-appointed counsel in order to 
force the court to appoint new counsel unless the defendant shows "good cause." 
See Wulffenstein, 733 P.2d at 121. To successfully show "good cause" for rejecting 
court-appointed counsel, a defendant must meet a heavy burden. A defendant must 
do more than show that he or she does not have a "meaningful relationship" with 
his or her attorney. See id. Moreover, "the fact that a defendant does not get along 
with his [or her] attorney does not, standing alone, establish a denial of the 
effective assistance of counsel." Gardner v. Holden, 888 P.2d 608, 622 (Utah 
1994) (plurality opinion), cert, denied, 516 U.S. 828, 133 L. Ed. 2d 52, 116 S. Ct. 
97 (1995). Instead, to establish "good cause" for rejecting a court-appointed 
attorney, a defendant "must also establish that the animosity [between the 
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defendant and his or her attorney] resulted in such a deterioration of the attorney-
client relationship that the right to the effective assistance of counsel was 
imperiled." Id; see also Pursifell, 746 P.2d at 274 ("Substitution of counsel is 
mandatory when the defendant has demonstrated good cause, such as a conflict of 
interest, a complete breakdown of communication, or an irreconcilable conflict 
with his or her attorney.1'). 
State v. Scales, 946 P.2d 377, 382 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
"The defendant may meet this burden by showing that the counsel offered him 
was incompetent or otherwise inadequate to the task of representing him. After all, [a] 
defendant cannot be forced to proceed with incompetent counsel... '[a] choice between 
proceeding with incompetent counsel or no counsel is in essence no choice at all.5" State 
v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, f 74, 63 P.3d 731 (quoting State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45,120, 
979 P.2d 799) (quoting Wilks v. Israel, 627 F.2d 32, 36 (7th Cir. 1980)). 
a. The Animosity Between Defendant and Counsel Resulted in the Deterioration 
of the Attorney-Client Relationship to the Point that it Affected Defendant's 
Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel 
In this case, the following deteriorations happened between counsel and defendant. 
• Defendant asserted that his attorneys were not keeping him informed of the 
progress on the case. Defense counsel disputed this. R. 133-41; 360:4-19. 
• Defense counsel approached the presiding judge, mid-trial, to indicate that 
their client had intimidated them to the point that it affected "our ability to 
continue to adequately and zealously represent Mr. Martinez in trial." R. 
344:7. Defendant expressed his concern to the court of defense counsel's 
fears, focusing on their ability to adequately communicate: 
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o "My lawyers, they feel intimidated by me, so, therefore, we have a 
conflict of interest. So therefore, they feel they are afraid of me or 
whatever their complaints would be. So, therefore, there's a conflict 
between me and the lawyers. So, therefore, I don't see how we can, 
you know, communicate without me feeling that there's a fear 
between me and them." R. 344:23. 
• Defense counsel represented that Mr. Martinez's intimidation caused them 
to make poor strategic decisions. R. 344:6, 7,136. 
• Defendant complained his counsel was ineffective for improperly 
impeaching a state witness. R. 343:114-15. 
• Defense counsel also apparently called the police after she had been 
followed home after the first day of trial. R. 360:3-4. 
Defense counsels' ability to zealously represent Mr. Martinez was clearly 
compromised, per counsels' own admissions on the record. Mr. Martinez allegedly stared 
them down and intimidated them to the point that counsel approached the presiding and 
the trial judge to express their concerns. R. 344:5-7. Counsel said these episodes affected 
their ability to make rational, strategic decisions in the case. R. 344:7. However, after the 
prosecution assured counsel that they would be protected, counsel felt more comfortable 
proceeding. R. 344:11-12. See also, R. 344:137 (defense counsel says that she can now 
represent Mr. Martinez "after sleeping on it, waking up this morning with some 
additional security that I felt like I am comfortable to go forward ..."). Such a 
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compromise clearly would affect not only a defendant's ability to communicate with his 
> counsel, but would also affect counsel's willingness and desire to act with the duty of 
loyalty. See State v. Holland, 876 P.2d at 362 ("Unless an attorney represents the interests 
of a client with zeal and loyalty, the adversarial system of justice cannot operate."). 
Counsel openly indicated that this experience affected his ability to "adequately and 
zealously" represent Mr. Martinez. R. 344:7. This would be the classic type of 
irreconcilable conflict. See Pursifell, 746 P.2d at 274 ("Substitution of counsel is 
mandatory when the defendant has demonstrated ... a conflict of interest, a complete 
breakdown of communication, or an irreconcilable conflict with his or her attorney."). 
Arguably, the defendant created these conflicts, however, the most serious 
violation appears to have been a "stare-down" as counsel alleged. Mr. Martinez did not 
threaten violence or extreme measures. Clearly, he had difficulty working with his 
appointed counsel, but he chose to raise these concerns with the court and to seek the 
appointment of an attorney who would, in his words, not deprive him of a fair trial and 
who would "represent him] to the fullest..." R. 344:23. 
Courts have frequently allowed defendants to obtain new counsel when a conflict 
exists, even if created by the defendant in much more severe situations than the one at 
hand. People v. Parker, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4159 (noting that a mistrial was 
declared after defendant threatened his attorney); State v. Toste, 504 A.2d 1036, 1046 
(Conn. 1986) (defendant was appointed two separate attorneys after threatening his 
attorney and refusing to cooperate); People v. Manuel, 9 A.D.3d 1185; 834 N.Y.S.2d 790 
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(N.Y. Sup. 2007) (noting defendant's delays were caused by seven attorney changes after 
defendant threatened his attorney); State v. Brillon, 955 A.2d 1108, 1120 (Vt. 2008) 
(noting trial court was "compelled" to allow counsel to withdraw after defendant 
threatened him). 
The clearest indication of the breakdown in the attorney-client relationship was 
counsel's closing argument, in which he told the jury that they did not have the option of 
finding the defendant not guilty—that they needed to find him guilty of either the 
attempted criminal homicide or of aggravated assault. R. 345:24-27. While counsel 
clearly hoped the jury would convict of the lesser-included offense, which they did, he 
did not give the jury the option of a not-guilty verdict if the jury believed the state had 
failed to meet its burden of proof. This is the type of advocacy the Supreme Court has 
expressly prohibited. See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 667 n. 19 ("[E]ven when no theory of 
defense is available, if the decision to stand trial has been made, counsel must hold the 
prosecution to its heavy burden of proof'beyond reasonable doubt.") (emphasis added). In 
fact, as to the aggravated assault and to the domestic violence offenses, defense counsel 
conceded that the state had met its burden for those offenses. R. 345:25-27. As the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals stated, "an attorney who adopts and acts upon a belief that his 
client should be convicted fail[s] to function in any meaningful sense as the 
Government's adversary." Osborn v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612, 625 (10th Cir. 1988) 
(quoting in part Cronic, 466 U.S. at 666)). 
32 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
> 
While both counsel indicated they would continue to zealously represent Mr. 
> Martinez, this promise seems merely illusory. Both counsel spoke with the presiding 
judge about how the defendant's intimidation caused them to be fearful and to not 
represent Mr. Martinez fully. Without anything changing in the situation, other than the 
state's promise of additional security, and then in front of the defendant, counsel said 
they could continue to represent him. Mr. Martinez continued, despite counsel's 
statements, to argue that the attorney client relationship had been destroyed, particularly 
as it related to the ability to communicate in confidence. Perhaps counsel could continue 
to represent Mr. Martinez at trial, however their communications with the defendant 
would have been drastically undermined. See Rule 1.4, Rules of Professional Conduct (a 
lawyer shall keep the client informed). 
Additionally, counsels' disclosure to the court of the threats against them arguably 
violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as to confidentiality and conflict of interest. 
See Rule 1.6, Rules of Professional Conduct; see also Rule 1.7(b) ("A lawyer shall not 
represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited ... by the 
lawyer's own interest."). An attorney may only disclose information relating to the 
representation of the client with the client's consent, if the matter involves future crimes 
or fraud, or to establish a lawyer's defense in a controversy with the client. Rule 1.6(a) 
and (b). See e.g., Spratley v. State Farm, 2003 UT 39, ffl[ 14-22, 78 P.3d 603 (while in-
house counsel could disclose matters of representation to insurers, under Rule 1.6, "it 
remains the attorney's duty to minimize disclosures" and "any disclosures made by the 
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attorney that are not reasonably necessary to [a] claim may still subject that attorney to 
professional discipline or litigation sanctions"); Utah Ethics Advisory Op. No. 05-02 
(Utah St. Bar) ("Where an attorney serving as defense counsel in a criminal case is 
expressly requested by the court at a sentencing hearing for information obtained from or 
about the defendant regarding the defendant's prior convictions, the attorney may only 
answer with the client's informed consent; otherwise, the attorney must respectfully 
decline to answer the court's request in a manner that will not be misleading to the 
court."). 
However, defense counsels' disclosures would probably have been appropriate to 
make the court aware of the seriousness of the conflict so that the court could appoint 
competent, non-conflicted counsel to represent the defendant, an action the trial court 
should have taken in this case. See e.g., State v. Holland, 876 P.2d 357, 359 (Utah 1994) 
(defense counsel should have been disqualified because of an actual conflict of interest). 
Perhaps most significantly, Mr. Martinez's attorneys withdrew as his appointed 
counsel after trial and had a conflict attorney appointed. R. 303-04. That attorney alleged 
that both trial attorneys were ineffective. R. 337-41. If defense counsel felt they could 
continue to confidently and zealously represent Mr. Martinez, then they would not have 
withdrawn as his attorneys. The fact that they withdrew and asked for a conflict attorney 
to represent Mr. Martinez for sentencing and future proceedings indicates the severity of 
the conflict and that an actual conflict existed from the moment of disclosure until well 
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after the trial. If counsel were unable to represent Mr. Martinez at sentencing, they clearly 
would have the same conflicts at trial. 
Additionally, the trial court failed to conduct an adequate colloquy to determine 
the extent of the breakdown of the attorney-client relationship. When the court informed 
defendant of his counsel's disclosures, Mr. Martinez immediately made a motion for new 
counsel. R. 344:17, 23. The court simply asked defense counsel if they could continue to 
represent Mr. Martinez. They said that they could and the court denied the motion. R. 
344:23-24, 27-28. Additionally, the trial judge accused Mr. Martinez of staring him down 
as he was denying the motion and seemed disinclined to consider Mr. Martinez's 
perspective. R. 344:27-28. At no point did the court discuss details with counsel; nor did 
the court ask them whether they would continue to have difficulty communicating with 
Mr. Martinez. It simply denied the motion without making inquiries into counsels' basis 
for fear or intimidation. 
In United States v. Walker, 915 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1990), the defendant filed a 
motion requesting new counsel, alleging his attorney was not fully representing him, 
finding witnesses or helping on his case. Id. at 481-82. The defendant alleged a 
communication breakdown, then the court summarily denied the motion. Id. at 483, 484. 
The appellate court was troubled that "the district court made virtually no attempt to 
discover the causes underlying Walker's dissatisfaction with his attorney." Id. Walker and 
his counsel were not speaking because of the conflict, the court discovered. Id. 483-84. 
As a result of the court's denial, the defendant "was forced into a trial with the assistance 
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of a particular lawyer with whom he was dissatisfied, with whom he would not cooperate, 
and with whom he would n o t . . . communicate. Thus, the attorney was understandably 
deprived of the power to present any adequate defense in [Walker's] behalf." Id. (quoting 
Brown v. Craven, 424 F.2d 1166,1169 (9th Cir. 1970)). The 9th Circuit did not attribute 
these faults to counsel, noting that it would be difficult to represent someone who will not 
speak with you. Id. at 484. But the court held that the failure to appoint substitute counsel 
deprived Walker of his right to effective assistance of counsel. Id. 
In United States v. Moore, 159 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 1998), the defendant made four 
separate motions in which he asked the court to appoint him substitute counsel due to a 
lack of communication. Id. at 1156. The court found that counsel and defendant 
frequently argued, defendant was not satisfied, he would not communicate with his 
attorney, and that the relationship was filled with threats and counter-threats. Id. at 1159-
60. Counsel also indicated in chambers that he feared his client would sue him and that 
affected their ability to communicate. Id. at 1160. The court, however, "made no inquiries 
to help it understand the extent of the breakdown." Id. In fact, the court felt it needed to 
move the trial along and didn't want to speculate as to the extent of the conflict. "The 
court was wrong, these facts are highly relevant to the existence and extent of conflict 
between Cozens and Moore, and the court had a duty to make further inquiries. The court 
seemed above all to be determined not to disturb its trial schedule ..." Id. Given these 
facts, the court found an irreconcilable conflict and remanded the case for a new trial. Id. 
at 1161. 
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• 
Similarly, in this case, the trial judge heard of the potential conflict and made no 
efforts to assess the extent of the breakdown. Frequently, when this issue was raised, the 
court would summarily deny the motion without making further inquiry and assert that 
the state should call its next witness or that the matter should move forward. R. 344:15-
16, 21, 27, 28, 29. The court erroneously failed to inquire into the details of the conflict. 
Mr. Martinez has shown on the record "that an actual conflict of interest adversely 
affected his lawyer's performance." Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 64 L. Ed. 2d 
333, 100 S. Ct. 1708 (1980). His lawyers were afraid of him and would not communicate 
with him. This conflict caused them to make strategically poor decisions by their own 
admissions and clearly affected the quality of defense counsel's closing argument and 
ability to represent Mr. Martinez in further proceedings after the trial. Because of the 
conflict, Mr. Martinez was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel and is entitled 
to a new trial with constitutionally conflict-free counsel. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Martinez respectfully requests that this Court find that the trial court deprived 
him of his right to effective assistance of counsel by failing to appoint a new attorney 
who did not have a conflict with him, or to even inquire into the nature of the conflict. He 
asks the Court to remand for a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ day of ^ ^ 1 2011. 
Q$£: 
SAMUgK P. NEWT ON~" 
Attorney-ior the Defendant/Appellant 
3P 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, SAMUEL P. NEWTON, hereby certify that I have caused to be deposited in the United 
States mail eight copies of the foregoing and an electronic CD of the foregoing to the 
Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and two 
copies and an electronic CD to the Utah Attorney General's Office, Heber M. Wells 
Building, 160 East 300 South, Third Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84114-0854, this 13 day of May, 2011. 
MAILED a true and correct copy of the foregoing and an electronic CD containing the 
foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Attorney General's Office as 
indicated above this 11? day of May, 2011. 
m^^ 
39 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
• 
ADDENDUM A 
Defendant's Pro Se Motion for New Counsel Alleging Ineffective Assistance 
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ADDENDUM B 
Rule 1.4,1.6,1.7, Rules of Professional Conduct 
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> 
Rule 1.4. Communication. 
(a) A lawyer shall: 
(a)(1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which 
the client's 
informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(e), is required by these Rules; 
(a)(2) reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client= s 
objectives are to be accomplished; 
(a)(3) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter; 
(a)(4) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and 
(a)(5) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer's conduct when 
the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of 
Professional Conduct or other law. 
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client 
to make informed decisions regarding the representation. 
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Rule 1.6. Confidentiality of Information. 
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless 
the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry 
out the representation or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b). 
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent 
the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
(b)(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm; 
(b)(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to 
result in substantial injury to the financial interest or property of another and in 
furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer's services; 
(b)(3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or 
property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the client's 
commission of a crime or fraud and in furtherance of which the client has used the 
lawyer's services; 
(b)(4) to secure legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with these Rules; 
(b)(5) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the 
lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the 
lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations 
in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client; or 
(b)(6) to comply with other law or a court order. 
(c) For purposes of this rule, representation of a client includes counseling a lawyer about 
the need for or availability of treatment for substance abuse or psychological or 
emotional problems by members of the Utah State Bar serving on an Utah State Bar 
endorsed lawyer assistance program. 
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Rule 1.7. Conflict of Interest: Current Clients. 
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the 
representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest 
exists if: 
(a)(1) The representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or 
(a)(2) There is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be 
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a 
third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer. 
(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under paragraph (a), 
a lawyer may represent a client if: 
(b)(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent 
and diligent representation to each affected client; 
(b)(2) the representation is not prohibited by law; 
(b)(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against 
another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before 
a tribunal; and 
(b)(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
